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Sinkler and Guerard: Public Corporations
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
HumR SiNxi.am

THoDorn B. GuLAnR'*
During the period under review, the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered a number of interesting questions, some of first
impression in this state, in the field of public corporations. Important to the future financing of sewer facilities is the Supreme
Court's upholding of the right of the General Assembly to provide for the imposition of an enforceable sewer service charge.
Annexation questions, which we have come to expect, were once
again before the court, as were questions regarding condemnation
actions. Of great significance in connection with the General
Assembly's efforts to provide for equal property assessments
throughout the state is the Supreme Court's decision upholding
the legislation providing for the reassessment of Richland County
School District No. 1.
SEWER REVENUE BONDS INTRODUCED
INTO SOUTH CAROLINA
Two of the more interesting decisions of recent years in the
field of public finance were handed down during the period
under review in the cases of Ruggles v. Padgett1 and Distin v.
2
Bolding.
The RuggZes decision concerns the effort of the Hianahan Public Service District, located to the North of North Charleston in
Berkeley County, to provide a system of public sewage disposal.
Sewage for the most part was handled by septic tanks, which,
due to the nature of the soil, functioned poorly.
The district did not own or control its water distribution facilities. They were owned and operated by the Commissioners of
Public Works of the City of Charleston which furnished water
to district residents.
The first problem encountered by the General Assembly in
connection with the construction of a district sewer system was
the method of financing. District general obligation bonds payable from a district-wide ad valorem tax could be issued but the
* Sinkler, Gibbes & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 240 S.C. 494, 126 S.E.2d 553 (1962).

This case is also noted in the

Constitutional Law section at note 25.

2. 240 S.C. 574, 126 S.E.2d 649 (1962).
118

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

1963]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12
SUV EY or SoTH CAROLIxA LAW

resulting tax burden would fall unfairly in many instances in
the light of the benefits obtained. If, on the other hand, the
bonds were retired from a sewer charge to be imposed upon those
actually using the sewer facilities, it would be difficult to enforce payment of sewer charges. Disconnection of the defaulting
property-owner's facilities from the sewer system would be unduly expensive and contribute to the unhealthy conditions sought
to be alleviated.
The district's problem was resolved in a novel fashion in South
Carolina. The General Assembly at its 1960 Session passed legislation enabling the district to issue (in addition to general obligation bonds in which case a vote was required), revenue bonds
payable from sewer charges. It further empowered the district
and the City of Charleston to enter into a binding agreement
whereby the city would collect the district's sewer charges and
enforce payment by cutting off the water service of any propertyowner in the district who failed to pay the sewer charge.
The appellants (appealing from the order of the circuit judge
sustaining the acts under attack) first contended that the General Assembly cannot by special legislation delegate-police powers
to the district enabling it to adopt mandatory regulations requiring persons within the district to connect to and use the district's
sewer system. They pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in
the case of Gaud v. Walker3 as authority for this contention.
There, in considering the Charleston County Council Act, Justice Oxner, in striking down that portion of the act attempting to
give Charleston County Council the power to enact and enforce
county police ordinances, used language which gave rise to the
inference that the General Assembly cannot by special act delegate any of its police power.
The Hanahan Public Service District was empowered to require connections, and upon refusal, to apply for enforcement
to a court of competent jurisdiction for the exercise of mandatory injunction or other remedial orders. The Supreme Court
held that the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution prohibiting special legislation do not prohibit the creation of a
special purpose district by special act. In upholding the delegation of power by special act to the District Commission to
adopt mandatory regulations to require sewer connections, the
court stated:
3. 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949).
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The Court below noted that since it has been definitely
settled by this Court that special purpose districts may be
created by special acts, it would be inconsistent to hold that
the basic purpose of such districts could not be fulfilled
through enforcement by appropriate civil measures. With
this we agree.
The Gaud decision, the Supreme Court held, does not apply
here but relates only to an attempt to delegate by special law to
a local agency the power to enact penal ordinances.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in the case under
review took a step which it had hesitated to do in its earlier decisions and expressly sustained the special acts here as a proper
exercise of the General Assembly's right to provide for municipal government by special provision as set forth in section 11
of article VII of the South Carolina Constitution. The court's
language is significant:
...

the term 'municipal' used in Section 11 cannot extend

in such manner as to provide authorization for special ordinances of a penal nature, such as those stricken down by
Gaud v. Walker, supra. However, we are satisfied that
measures, not creating crimes or misdemeanors, but which
are enacted for the maintenance of the public health in such
areas as special purpose districts or townships would be embraced by the term 'municipal government' as it is employed
in Section 11 of Article VII. Thus, a measure providing for
sewage disposal and the regulation of its uses would be embraced by Section 11 of Article VII. However, the function
permitted by the Special Act must clearly be an aspect of the
type of municipal service rendered by incorporated municipalities, for any enlargement of the term could have the effect of nullifying altogether subdivision 9, Section 34 of
Article III. It is the duty of the Court to synchronize and
not to nullify provisions in the Constitution. Only in this
way can legislation, special in nature, be sustained as not
violative of subdivision 9, Section 34, of Article III.
The appellants also questioned the right of the General Assembly to empower the district to impose a sewer charge with
which to provide debt service for the bonds to be issued. In disposing of this contention the Supreme Court held that the charge
here to be made is not an assessment and that an essential in-
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gredient of an assessment is a lien upon the property subject to
the assessment. The court pointed out that the charge here is
rather one for services rendered similar to charges for water,
gas or electric light service long sanctioned by earlier decisions.
Another question raised by the appellants related to the right
of the district and the city to enter into a contract whereby the
city would discontinue water service to any property-owner within the district who defaulted in the payment of sewer charge imposed by the district. In upholding this phase of the plan as a
proper exercise of the police power of the state, the Supreme
Court pointed to numerous decisions in other jurisdictions sustaining similar arrangements; the State of Alabama apparently
being the only dissenting voice on this point.
The appellants further contended that the General Assembly
was prohibited by section 1 or article VIII of the South Carolina
Constitution from empowering the City of Charleston to enter
into such an agreement unless at the same time it similarly empowered all other municipalities of the same class. The Supreme
Court struck down this objection upon the grounds that a municipality in the operation of a municipally-owned water system
has the incidental power to operate it in such fashion as to best
serve its customers, and that the proposed agreement obviously
being for the benefit of the Commissioners of Public Works
(which would obtain as consideration the district's small water
distribution system as improved) was, therefore, not an ultra
vires undertaking of the city.
The General Assembly in providing for the financing of sewer
construction in Jackson Gills Creek Public Service District, in
Richland County, was faced with problems somewhat similar to
those before it in connection with the HIanahan Public Service
District, and the legislation providing the method of meeting
the problems was sustained by the South Carolina4 Supreme
Court in its decision in the case of Distin v. Bolding.
As in the Ruggles case, the General Assembly was here faced
with a problem of obtaining revenues to provide debt service for
bonds to be issued to finance the construction of sewers. The
method adopted was to provide debt service in part from a district-wide ad valorem tax and in part from special assessments
levied against the properties making use of the sewer facilities.
Thus, part of the cost of construction would be spread through4. 240 S.C. 574, 126 S.E.2d 649 (1962).
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out the district by way of the ad valorem tax, while the remaining portion of the cost would be borne entirely by those using
the facilities. In addition to providing part of the debt service,
the sewer assessments would also provide for operation and maintenance of the system.
The method followed in the Ruggles case to enforce collection
was not available here because no single agency operated a waterworks system throughout the district, which was served partly
by public systems, partly by private water companies, and partly
by individual wells. In order to enforce collection the acts here
under attack provided that the sewer charges should constitute
liens upon the respective properties of the users which could be
enforced in the same fashion that the collection of county taxes
is enforced.
The appellant here (appealing from order of the circuit judge
sustaining the acts) urged many of the questions which were disposed of in the earlier Ruggle8 decision. The principal undecided question before the court for decision was the right of
the General Assembly to authorize the District Commission to
impose a special charge or assessment upon property-owners in
the district utilizing the public sewer system which would constitute a lien upon their property. The Supreme Court sustained
this right on the basis of the general rule that the legislative
branches of state governments have the inherent power to make
provisions for assessing of real property for benefits conferred,
and that this power had been sustained in earlier decisions of the
South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further
noted that its earlier decisions in the Evans5 and RutledgeO cases
confirmed the power of the General Assembly also to apportion
the impact of such assessments "in whole or in part upon the
property of such district, either according to valuation, or the
superficial area or frontage." The Supreme Court found no
merit in the appellants' contention that the General Assembly's
power to provide for such assessments was limited by several
earlier decisions including particularly Mauldin v. City Council
of Greenville.1 It recognized that the holdings in these decisions
related to sewer assessments imposed by a city.
The charge here was an assessment because it created a lien
upon the property benefited as distinguished from a mere charge
5. 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538 (1926).
6. 139 S.C. 188, 137 S.E. 596 (1927).
7. 53 S.C. 285, 31 S.E. 252 (1898).
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for services imposed in the Ruggles decision. Therefore, due
process required that the property-owners to be affected be given
notice and the opportunity of a hearing before the assessments
were levied. The acts provided for written notice of not less than
ten days to each affected property-owner notifying him of the
nature and quantum of the charge, and providing him an opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel. The acts further
protected the right of any property-owner to appeal to the court.
The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the acts relating
to notice and hearing fully met all the requirements of due process under both state and federal constitutions.
ANNEXATION QUESTIONS AGAIN BEFORE
THE COURT
Two extremely interesting questions involving annexation elections are decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court in its
8
decision in Creamer v. City of Anderson.
The plaintiffs challenged the official results of a special annexation election held on October 27, 1959, to extend the corporate limits of the City of Anderson. Section 47-16 of the 1962
Code provides that those voting within the city shall be registered, qualified, electors residing within the corporate limits of
the city, and that those voting within the area proposed to be
annexed shall be "registered, qualified, electors residing within
the territory proposed to be annexed." The voters of the City of
Anderson favored the annexation. However, the vote in the
area to be annexed as certified by the Commissioners of Election was 1569 in favor of annexation and 1500 against. The
plaintiffs contended that at least 70 votes cast in the area to
be annexed were illegal because they were cast by persons who
were not registered, qualified, electors residing within the territory propsed to be annexed at the time of the election, and that
these illegal votes being deducted from the favorable votes, the
number of votes in favor of annexation was reduced to less than
one-half of the total votes cast in the area to be annexed, thereby rendering the election ineffectual.
The special referee, to whom the matter had been originally
referred, upheld the election as valid, but the circuit judge reversed the special referee and held the election ineffectual.
8. 240 S.C. 118, 124 S.F_.2d 788 (1962).
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The first question to be resolved was the interpretation of Section 47-16 as it relates to the requirements of persons who are
eligible to vote within the area to be annexed. The special referee
had held as valid the votes cast by voters who did not reside
in the area to be annexed at the time of the election but who had
fulfilled both of two conditions: (1) within the seventeen months
immediately prior to the election, they had resided within the
said area; and (2) they had moved from the said area but had
not, according to their testimony, as yet established a new domicile. Under these circumstances the special referee held that the
residences previously established in the area to be annexed had
not been altered.
The circuit judge reversed the special referee on this point
and the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit judge. The Supreme Court noted that the Legislature was undoubtedly aware
of the special consequences which faced persons voting within
the respective areas in an annexation election when it required
that the votes of each of the two groups be separately cast and
be separately counted (Section 46-17 of the 1962 Code), and
that these special consequences differed for each group. The Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature intended by the use
of the word "residing" in Section 47-16 to limit the right to vote
on the issue of annexation to those registered, qualified, electors
"actually residing in each of the respective areas at the time
of the election, as distinguished from those who, although having
their legal domicile in such area, were actually residing elsewhere."

The decision appears to distinguish the annexation election
required under the statute here from elections which come within
the contemplation of Sections 2, 4 and 12 of article II of the
South Carolina Constitution. In the case of Cothran v. West
Dunklin Pub. SchooZ Dist. No. 1,9 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an act which provided for an election only by
electors who return real or personal property for taxation. The
Supreme Court held that as long as voters possessed the qualifications called for by the above mentioned constitutional provisions, they were entitled to vote in the election, and that the
legislature cannot require additional qualifications.
The second question decided relates to the treatment of illegal
votes. In cases where the margin of victory exceeds the number
9. 189 S.C. 85, 200 S.E. 95 (1938).
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of unidentifiable illegal votes no problem arises as a practical
matter because the illegal voting could not have affected the
outcome of the election. However, here the court was faced with
the situation where the margin of victory in favor of annexation
was less than the number of unidentifiable illegal votes. As a
general rule, this problem can be met in one of five ways:
(1) The election may be declared invalid;
(2) The vote of the precinct wherein the illegal voting occurred may be rejected;
(3) There may be a pro rata deduction of the illegal votes
according to the number of votes cast on each side;
(4) The illegality may be entirely ignored; or
(5) The illegal votes can be deducted from the winning side.10
The special referee, as to some of the illegal votes, had withdrawn them proportionately from each side. The circuit judge
reversed the special referee on this point and held that illegal
votes should be deducted from the winning side and the election
declared ineffectual. Again on this point, the Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit judge.
In so doing, the Supreme Court recognized that it is very unlikely that all of the illegal votes were against the winning side
and that, therefore, an illegal vote against annexation would be
counted twice: once when cast against annexation and a second
time when deducted from the favorable votes. However, the
Supreme Court pointed to the fact that a new election can determine with certainty which side of the question had received
greatest number of unquestionable votes. In this connection, our
Supreme Court has held in the case of Rutland v. City of Spartanburg'" that there is no statute limiting the number of annexation elections that may be held relating to the same area or
prescribing a period that must elapse between two such elections.
If the Rutland decision (which is not clear on the point) holds
that a second election can be held on the basis of the original
petition of freeholders and without the need for a new petition
of freeholders, the authorities cited by the court support its holding here. If, however, as would seem to be the case, a second
election could not have been held without first a second petition
being submitted, then the matter could not conveniently have
10. Annot., 155 A.L.R. 677 (1945).

11. 230 S.C. 255, 95 S.E.2d 443 (1956).
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been sent back for a new election. It seems to the writers that
the facts here might have been distinguishable for that reason
from the earlier decisions cited by the court. The fact that no
new election can be held upon the existing petition would appear
a strong argument for a proportionate withdrawal of the un2
identifiable illegal votes from each side.1
The court's opinion does not explain why the illegal voters (including particularly the 57 voters conceded illegal by the appellants) were not called to the stand and questioned as to how they
voted so that each illegal vote could be subtracted from the side
for which it was cast. While it is well established that a legal
and honest voter is privileged from testifying as to the candidate
for whom he cast his vote, the law does not protect illegal voters,
and the rule exempting an elector from testifying as to how he
cast his ballot has no application to an illegal voter.' 3
The 1795 case of Johnston v. Corporationof City of Charleston 14 decision contains language which is broad enough to create
some doubt as to whether in South Carolina even an illegal voter
can be questioned as to how he voted. However, the situation
there involved swearing the voter before the City Council of
Charleston, not before a court of law. It would seem unlikely
for South Carolina to dissent from the rule set forth above which
appears to be generally accepted and well founded. In any event,
the privilege to refuse to testify for whom he cast his ballot is
personal to the voter and can be raised and waived by him only.
Laws providing for the secrecy of the ballot do not preclude
inquiry into the question for whom votes were cast since the voter,
if he so desires, may waive the privilege of secrecy.15
In the case of Hollingsworth v. City of Greenville,'6 the
plaintiff property owners sought to enjoin the inclusion of their
land in territory to be annexed to the City of Greenville. They
alleged that their property was largely unimproved farm land
without roads or streets, having no need of municipal police or
fire protection, and that its annexation would benefit neither the
city nor the property owners. Therefore its inclusion in the
proposed territory to be annexed was unreasonable and arbitrary.
12. McCRARY oN ELECTo, §§ 495-497 (4th Ed. 1897); Annot., 155 A.L.R.
677 (1945).
13. 18 Am. JuR. Elections 308 (1939); Amnot., 90 A.L.R. 1362 (1934).
14. 1 Bay 441 (S.C., 1795).
15. 18 At JuR. Elections § 308 (1939).
16. 241 S.C. 378, 128 S.E.2d 704 (1962).
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In August, 1961, a petition signed by a majority of the freeholders of a large territory lying east and south of the City of
Greenville sought an annexation election. On September 15, the
plaintiffs instituted this action, and on September 19, the election
was held and resulted in favor of the annexation.
The lower court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
sustain the burden of proving that the inclusion of their land was
unreasonable or arbitrary, and therefore denied the injunction
and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that annexation is a legislative function with which the courts
will rarely interfere on the grounds that it is unnecessary, unreasonable, or without benefit. However, in this connection the
Supreme Court noted that the appellants' land actually lay in
the heart of and bisected the area proposed to be annexed, and
that if the appellants' property was excluded a much larger
territory within the area to be annexed would not have been adjacent to the city and therefore ineligible for annexation.
Prior to the filing of the freeholders' petition with the city
council, the appellants had requested that their property be deleted from the property described in the petition. On this point
the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit judge's holding that the
city council was without power to delete property from the petition. The appellants contended that the absence of such power
in the city council rendered the annexation statute and the proceedings thereunder unreasonable and invalid and, in effect, deprived the appellants of their rights without due process of law.
However, the constitutional issue was not raised below nor passed
on by the trial judge and therefore was not passed on by the
Supreme Court, although the opinion does state that the statutory
provisions "afforded a reasonable and democratic means of the
exercise of the legislative power."
17
In the case of Dalton v. Town Council of Mount Pleasant
the South Carolina Supreme Court had to consider the question
whether or not the petition of freeholders required by Section
47-14 of the 1952 Code prior to the calling of an annexation election was signed by the required majority of freeholders.
On January 17th, 1955, three separate petitions each describing
a separate area were filed with the Town Council of Mount
Pleasant in Charleston County. Each petition asked for an
17. 241 S.C. 546, 129 S.E.2d 523 (1963).
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election on the question of the annexation of the area described
therein to the Town of Mount Pleasant. The town council determined that each petition was signed by a majority of the freeholders of the area therein described and certified this fact to
the County Commissioners of Elections. Before elections were
held, however, the town council decided on the annexation of a
larger area, including the three areas described in the petitions
of January 17th. Therefore, a new petition describing the enlarged area to be annexed was circulated and filed with the town
council on or before February 17th, 1955. At a special meeting on
that date the actions previously taken with respect to the January
17th petitions were rescinded, and the town council certified that
a majority of the freeholders of the larger area proposed to be
annexed had petitioned for an election. An election was subsequently held which resulted favorable to the annexation.
Within the prescribed time the plaintiff instituted this action
to have the annexation voided on the grounds that the petition
had not been signed by a majority of the freeholders in the area
to be annexed. The matter was referred to the master who ruled
the annexation void, and this ruling was affirmed by the Circuit
Court.
Assuming, as contended by the appellants, that 228 freeholders'
signatures to the petition would have constituted a majority, the
issue here involved 23 signatures which the appellants contended
should have been added to the 214 signatures found valid by the
master to give the necessary majority.
These 23 persons, however, had not signed the petition circulated describing the larger area to be annexed. All of them
had signed one of the three petitions filed on January 17th, asking for an election on the question of annexing one of the smaller
areas subsequently included in the larger area voted on.
In affirming the circuit court the Supreme Court held that
the 23 persons in question did not sign a petition "for the election on the annexation of the territory in question." The court
concluded that the petitions signed by the 23 persons for elections
on the annexation of different areas, even though these areas subsequently were included in the area annexed, were in fact
separate and distinct petitions praying for elections on different
annexations. It pointed to its holding in the case of Hollingswort v. The City of Greenville 8 that a city council has no
18. 241 S.C. 378, 128 S.E.2d 704 (1962).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

1963]

Sun-v
or Law
SouTH
CAoLiNA
South
Carolina
Review,
Vol. 16,LAW
Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12

authority to delete a portion of the area described in an annexation petition as authority for its holding here that the city
council is equally without power to increase such an area.
While the matter was before the circuit judge on exceptions
to the master's report, the circuit judge allowed 18 of the 23
electors above mentioned to intervene in behalf of annexation.
The Supreme Court held that this intervention could not affect
the signatures to the petition and that these persons could not in
effect ratify "the unwarranted action of Town Council in counting them as Petitioners."
Finally, the appellant town argued that the plaintiff lacked
standing to maintain the action because she was not a freeholder.
The appellants conceded that the plaintiff, being a voter, was a
person interested to contest the election, but they urged that
plaintiff, not being a freeholder, was not a person interested to
contest the sufficiency of the petition. The Supreme Court,
however, held that the distinction sought was untenable because
the statute makes interest in'
the extension of the limits of a city
or town the criterion. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that
an elector in the area to be annexed is a person interested to
attack both the sufficiency of the petition and the election.
The annexation had been in effect for more than six years
when it was finally ruled invalid in the decision under review.
During that time municipal services had been extended to and
municipal taxes collected in the area thought to have been annexed. Thus, upon the rendering of the decision here the town
was faced with serious administrative problems. These problems
became largely academic however when new annexation proceedings were begun immediately and resulted in the annexation to
the town of a large area including all the area "de-annexed" by
the decision here.
REASSESSMENT OF PORTION OF
RICULAND COUNTY UPHELD
At its 1958 session, the General Assembly provided by legislative enactments for a reassessment of property in School District No. 1 of Richland County, apparently prompted by "gross
inequities and inequalities" which had existed with respect to
the assessment of real estate in the school district. In its de-
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cision in Hampton v. Dodson1 9 the Supreme Court considered
the validity of these enactments.
The acts under attack created the Richland County Board of
Assessment Control, giving it certain duties and powers with
respect to the assessment of all taxable property within School
District No. 1, only. The Act provided for the employment of
personnel including a tax assessor for School District No. 1, and
transferred to the assessor all powers, duties, and privileges of
the Board of Tax Assessors, Board of Township Assessors and
Chairmen of Boards of Assessors, so far as they related to the
assessment and valuation of property in School District No. 1,
subject, however, to policies determined by the board.
The desired equalization of taxes was undertaken pursuant
to appropriate orders issued by the South Carolina Tax Commission, pursuant to the powers vested in it under Section 65-64
(15) of the 1962 Code.
The reassessment program was undertaken by trained personnel in an effort to equalize assessments not only within School
District No. 1, but also to equalize assessments with respect to
real property in other school districts. However, no reassessment
program was being undertaken in a similar fashion with trained
appraisal personnel in any other school district of Richland
County.
The circuit judge affirmed the report of the master with certain modifications and dismissed the complaint. The appeal here
followed. The appellants contended that the reassessment would
result in unequal valuation and assessment of property in the
school district with the result that taxpayers of the school district would bear a greater burden with respect to county-wide
millage than would taxpayers in other school districts of the
county, and that the tax money being expended for the reassessment program was being illegally and unconstitutionally expended.
As to the first contention, the Supreme Court held that the
reassessment program was being carried out in accordance with
the general law with respect to the valuation and assessment of
property which governed all school districts in Richland County,
and that the assessment program was not being carried out under
any rules, regulations or policies inconsistent with the general
statutory law. As to the second contention, the Supreme Court
19. 240 S.C. 532, 126 S.E.2d 564 (1962).
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held that the reassessment program, being carried out in compliance with the general law, is a necessary and proper expenditure of tax money.
The Supreme Court refrained from passing upon the numerous constitutional questions raised because it found it unnecessary
to do so on the basis of two considerations: (1) If upon completion of the reassessment program, there should exist any inequality of treatment between the several districts in Richland
County, any aggrieved taxpayer would have exactly the same
remedy which he had prior to the acts in question, and (2) The
appellants, having failed to prove any injury or threatened injury as a result of the acts or anything being done pursuant
thereto, are not in a position to question the constitutionality of
the acts, because one not prejudiced by enforcement of a statute
cannot question its constitutionality.
CONDEMNATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
HELD COMPENSABLE
In the case of School Dist. No. 8 of CharZeston County v. Country Club of Charleston,20 the South Carolina Supreme Court
decided a question of novel impression in this state and one on
which there is an irreconcilable conflict of decisions from other
jurisdictions.
School District No. 3 of Charleston County had condemned
about six acres out of a larger seventy-one acre tract adjoining
the golf course of the Country Club of Charleston. The larger
tract was owned by MacDonald and Parks, a partnership, which
had purchased it several years earlier from the country club to
develop it as a residential subdivision. The development of the
seventy-one acre tract would undoubtedly affect the adjoining
property of the country club. For this reason, the country club
retained the right to enforce residential restrictions upon the
entire seventy-one acre tract. The country club refused to consent to an amendment to the restrictions permitting the six acre
parcel of the seventy-one acre tract sold to MacDonald and
Parks to be used as a school site.
The residential restrictions were abolished by the condemnation
suit that followed as far as they affected the six acre site taken
for a school. Thus, the question arose whether or not the extin20. 241 S.C. 215, 127 S.E2d 625 (1962).
Property section at note 1.

This case is also noted in the
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guishnent of these restrictions represented the taking of a
property right for which the country club was entitled to compensation.
This question has been considered in many jurisdictions and
the courts of other states are evenly split between permitting recovery and denying recovery in such cases. In the case under
review, the referee and the circuit court had decided that restrictions constitute a property right, the extinguishment for which
is compensable. However, both the referee and the circuit court
had also held the extinguishment of the restrictive covenants in
the instant case had not in fact damaged the country club, and
awarded only nominal damages of $25.00 on account of their
extinguishment.
For this reason the question was largely academic and was not
argued before the Supreme Court in the briefs or on oral argument. The Supreme Court's decision here affirming the Circuit
Court nevertheless appears to settle this question in South
Carolina.
STATUS OF SPECIAL MASTER UNDER PUBLIC
WORKS EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
In its decision in SohooZ Dist. No. 10 of Charleston v. WaZlace,2' the Supreme Court had occasion to consider for the first

time the status of a special master appointed pursuant to the
provisions of the Public Works Eminent Domain Law in relation to the statutory provisions relating to masters in general.
There the school district had instituted condemnation proceedings
under the Public Works Eminent Domain Law to acquire a
school site. More than six years after the matter had been referred to a special master (for the purpose of determining the
amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken and
the persons to whom it should be paid) and before any report
was filed, the school district served notice upon the property
owners that it had elected to end the reference under the provisions of Sections 10-1413, 10-1414, and 25-123 of the 1952 Code.
The school district's motion to end the reference was heard
and denied by the lower court, which accepted the report of the
special master filed the day after the school district gave notice
of its election to end the reference. The appeal here followed.
21. 241 S.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 167 (1962).
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The appellant school district contended that the provisions
of Sections 10-1413 and 10-1414, providing that reports of masters and referees in general shall be filed within 60 days from
the time the matter is finally submitted to them and upon failure
to do so either party can elect to end the reference, applied with
like effect to special masters appointed under the Public Works
Eminent Domain Law.
The lower court held that Sections 10-1413 and 10-1414 governed, but also held that under the facts the report of the special
master was filed within 60 days from the time that the matter
was finally submitted to him.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the grounds upon which
the lower court based its decision but affirmed its conclusion.
The Supreme Court held that as between the general statutory
provisions of Sections 10-1413 and 10-1414 and the special provisions contained in the Public Works Eminent Domain Law,
the latter must prevail in an action brought under the said law,
and that this result followed regardless of the fact that the special
master appointed also held the office of Master in Equity for
Charleston County.
Therefore the issue before the Supreme Court was determined
with reference to Section 25-123 (part of the Public Works
Eminent Domain Law) which provides that the report of a
special master must be filed within 30 days after the date of his
qualification. There is no provision in the Public Works Eminent Domain Law analogous to the provisions of the general law
permitting a party to elect to end a reference. Appellant's attempted election to do so under Section 10-1414 was held to be
ineffectual as that section did not apply.
The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold that the time limit
set forth in Section 25-123 was directory rather than mandatory,
and that the special master's failure to observe the time limit
therein set forth did not ipso facto deprive him of jurisdiction
of the matter. However, the Supreme Court construed Section
25-123 to impose a duty upon the special master to expeditiously
dispose of the matter referred to him, and noted that either party
upon his failure to comply with Section 25-123 might have the
special master removed or require him to make his report. The
court held that until the special master had been removed as such,
his jurisdiction continued, and that whether or not his report
would be received and considered after the expiration of 30 days
was a matter within the discretion of the lower court.
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